

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN:A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACHES AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACHES AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, by Major Nicholas A. Griffiths, 71 pages.

The recent counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan revitalized interest in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. After multiple iterations changing approaches from a lethal enemy-centric approach to a whole-of-government population-centric approach, the U.S. Army continues to revise its doctrine Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* to address the needs of the current and anticipated environments. During this revision a debate has come to the forefront questioning which counterinsurgency practices and approaches lead to success. This monograph analyzed two successful counterinsurgencies using a methodology similar to the RAND study *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* to test the validity of the most common methods employed in best practice counterinsurgency. While each counterinsurgency campaign is unique and requires employment of different methods, based on the analysis of the two successful campaigns, this monograph suggests that the probability of success in a counterinsurgency campaign increases through using an adaptive approach comprised of mixed-methods.

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ACRONYMS

COIN	Counterinsurgency
FM	Field Manual
G.O.	General Order

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INTRODUCTION

Not only will the outcome of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq shape the security environment for decades to come, but the character of these wars—with enemies hiding among populations, manipulating the information environment, and employing a challenging mix of tactics and technology—will be an important part of the future spectrum of conflict.

—U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*

Throughout the last 12 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the United States (U.S.) Army reestablished its counterinsurgency (COIN) proficiency. In 2004, the U.S. Army published the Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and then subsequently published the Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* in 2006, thereby beginning to embrace the steep learning curve of COIN.¹ This change moved the American way of war away from a conventional enemy-centric approach to a counterinsurgency focused population-centric approach.² The key influences to this doctrinal change incorporated American lessons learned from Vietnam; and British practices since World War II—most notably the Malayan Emergency; and recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.³ Initially, the U.S. looked to the British experiences and doctrine for a successful way to conduct COIN. But some scholars claimed the American COIN approach surpassed the British COIN approach during Operation

¹Daniel Marston, “Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07,” in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (New York, NY: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 232.

²Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army.” *Parameters* 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 5, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/198081087?accountid=28992> (accessed 25 September 2013). See also, Kalev I. Sepp, “From ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq.” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (March 2007): 218, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590601153606> (accessed 25 September 2013).

³Gentile, 11. See also, Michael Fitzsimmons, “Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (June 2008): 360, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390802024692> (accessed 25 September 2013).

Iraqi Freedom and continued to lead the development of COIN practice.⁴ However, many authors argue that the current U.S. COIN approach may not be the right one.⁵ This ambiguity fosters the debate over the best approach to enable success in COIN operations and led to the present dilemma.

Although the U.S. forces will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014 and conclude its longest COIN campaign in history, it will not be the last time U.S. forces conduct COIN operations. In light of the current debate over the best approach to enable success in counterinsurgency, this study seeks to identify which COIN approach the U.S. should use in future counterinsurgencies. The primary research question is: in the future should COIN forces adopt an exclusively enemy-centric or population-centric approach to gain a comparative advantage and increase the potential for success? This study's hypothesis is that a COIN force

⁴Andrew Mumford states in his Strategic Studies Institute Paper, "Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future," "[a]fter the withdrawal from Iraq, the British COIN establishment stands at a crossroads. The underwhelming performance in and around Basra contrasted with the American display of striking strategic vision and tactical ability in the realm of COIN. The publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the rise to prominence and influence of the COIN-savvy General Petraeus, the inculcation of COIN learning at all levels of the American military, and the ubiquity of COIN thinking in the United States across the academic-military divide, have all contributed to a quantum leap of American fluency in irregular warfare;" Andrew Mumford, "Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future," Research paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2011, 20-21. Warren Chin also suggested the paradigm shift of British forces learning from American COIN practices when he stated, "Evidence for this in the current Iraq conflict is anecdotal, but a view expressed by a number of British Army officers is that they are losing their comparative advantage in counterinsurgency because of the experience gained by US forces fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. In essence, the British might need to start learning from the Americans!" Warren Chin, "Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18, no. 1 (2007): 1, 22, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310601173204> (accessed 25 September 2013).

⁵Chin, 14-15. See also Fitzsimmons, 360-361.

should use an adaptive approach comprised of mixed-methods to adjust to the environment as necessary.⁶

To test the hypothesis and address the research question, this monograph will analyze two successful counterinsurgencies to show how the COIN forces adapted their approaches throughout each campaign using mixed-methods to meet the needs of the environment. Section two of this monograph, Literature Review, addresses the body of work that discusses various COIN approaches. Section three, Methodology, explains the method for testing the hypothesis. Section four, Case Studies, includes one British counterinsurgency, the Second Boer War 1899-1902, and one American counterinsurgency, the Philippine War 1899-1902, as well as a comparative analysis of both COIN approaches. Section five, Conclusions and Recommendations, contains the findings according to the research questions and recommendations for future research.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The amount of counterinsurgency literature available is too vast to encapsulate into one discussion, and well beyond the scope of this study. This study examines counterinsurgency theory from multiple perspectives.⁷ The selected works discussed in this section of the monograph represent the common views of each perspective. This literature review contains three

⁶For the purpose of this study the term “mixed-methods,” when referring to a COIN approach, means the combination of various practices to form an adaptive operational approach to counterinsurgency. The RAND monograph series by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), discussed in section two of this monograph, addresses the various methods available for an approach.

⁷This monograph uses the phrase “multiple perspectives” to describe the different viewpoints or theories that various counterinsurgency authors, scholars, and practitioners adopted. Generally speaking, the counterinsurgency perspectives fall into one of three categories: enemy-centric COIN, population-centric COIN, and adaptive COIN.

parts. First is a 2010-RAND monograph series, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, that addresses a broad study across numerous cultural, political, and geographical settings during the last 35 years. The purpose of reviewing *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* is to establish the framework for the methodology this monograph uses to analyze each cases study. Additionally, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* provides a common understanding of the many methods employed by COIN forces to shape their approach. The second part encompasses the body of literature that informed counterinsurgency over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from the British and American perspectives. Third is a summary of the literature review and justification for the two case studies in section four of this monograph. The purpose of this literature review is to establish a base of knowledge for the reader to better understand the different approaches used in the two cases studies.

Part 1: *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*

The 2010 RAND monograph series *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* established a framework for analyzing and identifying various methods employed by different COIN forces.⁸ The study is a two-volume monograph series that sought to answer the primary research question “[w]hen a country becomes host to an insurgency, which counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches

⁸*Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* used the word “approach” to describe various actions employed by the COIN force. Each approach consists of different factors that further describe the actions of the COIN force. This can be confusing because within the literature the words “approach” and “method” are often used interchangeably and to describe a number of different aspects. For example, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* identifies 20 approaches to analyze each case study, but the study also mentions the idea of a “population-centric approach” that contains one or more of the 20 approaches they describe through various factors. The use of the same word to describe different parts of a COIN strategy can cause confusion. For the purposes of clarity this monograph uses the term “approach” to describe the total sum of all methods employed by a COIN force. Additionally, this monograph uses the term “method” to describe the group of actions a COIN force used to achieve an effect. For example, the methods of “development” and “pacification” fall under a population-centric approach because these methods focus on actions towards the population. Whereas the methods of “cost-benefit” and “border control” fall under an enemy-centric approach because the focus of these methods is the insurgent force.

give the government the best chance of prevailing.”⁹ To answer this research question, the RAND monograph developed a methodology analyzing 30 cases of varying types of counterinsurgencies. The study’s authors applied 57 factors to each of the cases to determine which of the 20 distinct counterinsurgency methods the COIN force used, and at what point in the campaign. These 20 methods compiled from previous studies—categorized into classic COIN, contemporary COIN, and insurgency COIN—represent a number of different techniques grouped together.¹⁰ The 30 cases analyzed in the monograph series covered the period from 1978 to 2008 with different geographical, political, and cultural settings. The RAND monograph divided each case into “phases” and coded the phases for evidence of the 20 COIN methods.¹¹ The study determined five major findings that produced seven recommendations, but did not conclusively identify

⁹Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 1.

¹⁰Ibid., 32; by classic COIN, this monograph refers to the categorization used in the *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, which does not specifically define “classic COIN method.” *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* notes to reference Austin Long’s *On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* for a review of classic COIN approaches. See footnote in Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, xv. However, *On “Other War”* does not define or list “classic” approaches either. The closest statement to a definition offered in either RAND monograph addressing “classic COIN methods” is in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* stating “Some of these approaches were drawn from classical perspectives on COIN from the previous century;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, xv. Therefore, based on the interpretation of this monograph’s author, the phrase “classic COIN method” refers to those methods commonly employed prior to the twenty-first century. Similarly, this monograph refers to the categorization used in the *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* to reference “contemporary COIN methods.” With no formal definition offered by the RAND study, this monograph considers a suitable description of “contemporary” to be those methods associated with being introduced during the twenty-first century.

¹¹*Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* used the term “phase” to describe the different stages within the COIN campaign. A phase change occurred when either the COIN force or the insurgent force changed their “approach” or the environmental conditions changed causing a variance in the campaign. In addition, the criteria used to denote a “phase” change encompasses a “macro-level and sea-change;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 7.

which approach gives a COIN force or government the best chance of success.¹² However, the study's framework provides value for those who wish to gain a deeper understanding of the methods and approaches used by a COIN force.

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers analyzed numerous conflicts to determine the best methods to conduct a successful COIN campaign. The series created a methodology to code each counterinsurgency according to common evaluative criteria to identify, in both successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies, the methods that brought about the highest probability of success. This framework enables a greater analysis of the specific approach implemented in a counterinsurgency. Furthermore, it establishes a common system for comparing different approaches using the same criteria.¹³ The next part of this literature review discusses some of the counterinsurgency theories that informed the 20 distinct methods identified in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, as well as addressing a general discussion of counterinsurgency from British and American perspectives.

Part 2: Counterinsurgency Perspectives

The purpose of this part of the literature review is to address the various scholars, authors, and practitioners of counterinsurgency theory. The works discussed here generally follow one of two COIN perspectives—enemy-centric or population-centric.¹⁴ The literature

¹²For a detailed description of the study's findings see Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 93-99.

¹³One flaw in the framework is the minimum threshold for evidence of an approach and the number of factors common to multiple approaches. The minimum criteria allow an observer to code multiple methods based on only a few common factors. This potentially decreases the accuracy in coding a method as evident.

¹⁴This monograph uses the term “adaptive” when referencing COIN approaches to describe an approach that uses elements of population-centric and enemy-centric approaches to fit the needs of the environment.

selected for discussion in this monograph represents a broad overview of counterinsurgency from multiple perspectives in an attempt to offer the reader a more complete understanding.

In 1967, Julian Paget wrote *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques on Guerrilla Warfare*. He conducted an analysis of three British counterinsurgencies—Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus—to identify the best techniques and methods to defeat insurgencies. In his examination of the Malayan Emergency, Paget advocated for the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population by first protecting them, and then isolating them from the insurgent force.¹⁵ Paget claimed the government's ability to show its capability to defeat the insurgent force and the capability to protect the population from insurgent retribution were the two requirements to gain the support of the population and ultimately win their hearts and minds.¹⁶ Additionally, he claimed the cooperation between the civilian, military, and police authorities through the Briggs Plan developed an extended intelligence network under a single entity in the Chief of Intelligence.¹⁷ This intelligence network increased information sharing and proved to be “a decisive factor in not only defeating the insurgents, but also in establishing a political solution.”¹⁸ Paget's examination of British counterinsurgency recommended an enemy-centric approach initially focused actions on insurgent forces to win over the population and achieve a political solution.

In *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, John J. McCuen viewed the problem of counterinsurgency from the perspective of an indigenous force fighting against what he called a

¹⁵Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, NY: Walker and Company, 1967), 76-77.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 176.

¹⁷For additional information on the Briggs plan see John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 144.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 78.

Maoist revolutionary strategy.¹⁹ McCuen proposed an enemy-centric approach to COIN whereby a COIN force or government adopted the revolutionary strategy and used it against the insurgents.²⁰ This strategy consisted of the phased methods which he described in five principles—“preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy, establishing strategic bases, mobilizing the masses, seeking outside support, [and] unifying the effort.”²¹ This approach, while focused on defeating the insurgent force, is inherently adaptive in nature like the Maoist revolutionary strategy. Because of McCuen’s understanding of the nature of revolutionary strategy, he acknowledged the necessity of adaptation to his COIN approach. This is evident when he stated “as we have observed in all counter-revolutionary war, the fact that many of the techniques are abbreviated or altered to fit the local conditions must be considered the rule rather than the exception.”²²

In *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, Frank Kitson also addressed a COIN approach against a Maoist insurgency. Kitson identified three elements to a counterinsurgency operation—the face of the insurgency, the armed group and supporting elements of the insurgency, and the population.²³ He identified the first two elements as the “target proper” and population as the environment in which the target exists.²⁴ Kitson argued that gaining control of the population is paramount and “must base its campaign on a determination to

¹⁹McCuen, 30. McCuen describes the Maoist revolutionary strategy containing four phases: organization, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare; McCuen, 40.

²⁰Ibid., 29.

²¹Ibid., 329.

²²Ibid., 323.

²³Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (London, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971), 49.

²⁴Ibid.

destroy the subversive movement utterly.”²⁵ To accomplish this, Kitson argued for systematic pacification, whereby the COIN force conducted offensive operations to gain control of an area then transitioned security to a locally established police force before moving to another area.²⁶ The approach allowed a more permanent security force throughout the conflict area to protect the population from insurgent reprisal.

In another one of Kitson’s works, *Bunch of Five*, he expanded on his original premise establishing the basis for his argument as the fight for support of the population. As he phrased it, “insurgency is largely a battle for men’s minds.”²⁷ Part of the “battle for men’s minds” included denying insurgent influence over the population and establishing programs which he called “a hearts and minds campaign.”²⁸ He further argued that political or military solutions alone could not defeat insurgencies.²⁹ He stated “an effective counter-insurgency strategy campaign should consist of a mixture of political and economic measures combined with the operations of the forces of law.”³⁰

In *The Army in Vietnam*, Andrew Krepinevich offered a similar opinion on counterinsurgency approaches. In his critique of the American experience in Vietnam, he suggested a “unified approach” coordinating all aspects of a counterinsurgency strategy through “clear-and-hold” operations as a means of separating the population from the insurgents.³¹

²⁵Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, 50.

²⁶Ibid., 133.

²⁷Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 286.

²⁸Ibid., 295.

²⁹Ibid., 283.

³⁰Ibid., 284.

³¹Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 13.

Krepinevich made the distinction between shifting the focus away from destroying insurgent forces and towards “asserting government control over the population and winning its support.”³² Additionally, he used the analogy of the “oil drop” to articulate the desired effect of expanding government controlled zones after clearing enemy held terrain and then establishing security to protect the population from retribution.³³

Andrew Birtle presented a different perspective on similar counterinsurgency methods in his two-volume series *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* and *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976*. In his examination of American COIN doctrine and practice from 1860 to 1976, Birtle argued the American approach consisted of a “carrot-and-stick” method of counterinsurgency. He stated:

[t]he Army characterized this carrot-and-stick policy as being firm but fair, a nineteenth-century formulation that the Army would continue to apply to all of its military government, civil affairs, counterinsurgency, and pacification programs during the twentieth century.³⁴

The carrot-and-stick method is comprised of a dual policy of incentives and punishments. The concept applies to both insurgents and the population in the conflict area. It encompassed the balancing of two complimentary methods aimed to persuade those willing to comply with American actions through public works and amnesty programs, and coerce those who resisted through use of force.³⁵ Birtle discussed the evolution of the approach, from the institution of General Order (G.O.) 100 through the end of Vietnam War, as a balance between the emphasis on

³²Krepinevich, 11.

³³Ibid., 15. For additional information on the “oil spot concept” see McCuen, 325 and 329.

³⁴Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2006), 493.

³⁵Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2004) 260.

either persuasion or coercion based on the context of the conflict.³⁶ However, he argued that in the latter half of the twentieth century modern technology, international law, and public opinion altered the balance towards persuasion over coercion, representing the incorporation of a hearts and minds philosophy.³⁷

Colin Gray offered a more recent discussion of counterinsurgency in *War, Peace and International Relations*. Gray addressed the subject of warfare by dividing it into two distinct types—regular and irregular. Gray defined regular warfare as armed conflict between regular forces of states, and irregular warfare as armed conflict between regular forces and “irregular armed forces of non-state political entities.”³⁸ His view towards irregular warfare encompassed insurgency alongside other types of irregular war, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare. However, he makes the distinction between these types of warfare when he states that insurgency “is not a military technique.”³⁹ According to Gray, while conducting counterinsurgency requires military competence, it also requires the ability to address “public safety, good governance, and cultural empathy.”⁴⁰ This view points to a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency that Gray addresses with 11 principles of COIN.⁴¹ Gray’s population-centric approach to COIN

³⁶General Order 100 was first established in 1863 for the purpose of defining conduct of the U.S. Army’s interactions with civilian populations. For additional information see Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, 34-35; and Robert D. Ramsey III, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 117-141.

³⁷Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976*, 493-495.

³⁸Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 245.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 250.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹See Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 252 for an in-depth discussion of Gray’s 11 “most important principles” of COIN.

highlights the need for a whole of government solution to gain the favor of the population, instead of a seeking solely a military victory.⁴² Additionally, while Gray advocates for the understanding and implementation of his 11 principles, he addresses the COIN force's need to adapt its approach to fit the environment.⁴³

John A. Nagl discussed another perspective on counterinsurgency in *Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam*. Nagl used examples of British forces in Malaya and American forces in Vietnam to illustrate the necessity of learning and adapting. He pointed out that the British campaign in Malaya began as an enemy-focused operation targeting the insurgent forces under the Briggs Plan and then Sir Gerald Templer adjusted the strategy to focus on the population.⁴⁴ Nagl argued that British success in Malaya resulted from the British military's ability to adapt as a "learning institution" which enabled it to successfully adjust its counterinsurgency approach throughout the conflict.⁴⁵ In comparison, Nagl argued that the American military in Vietnam emphasized a conventional campaign to defeat insurgent forces "through an attrition-based search and destroy strategy."⁴⁶ He claimed the American military's organizational preference for conventional war stalled adaptation of the COIN approach. Nagl

⁴²Gray, 252.

⁴³Ibid., 253.

⁴⁴Nagl states that "the formula Briggs designed focused on the need to separate the insurgents from their source of supply and recruits in the population;" John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 71. Whereas "Templer created and enforced a clear chain of responsibility for the winning and maintaining of the security, hearts, and minds of the Malayan people;" Nagl, 101.

⁴⁵Ibid., 11.

⁴⁶Ibid., 191.

stated the American military in Vietnam failed to become a “learning institution,” thereby inhibiting its ability to adapt its counterinsurgency approach.⁴⁷

Part 3: Summary and Justification

There are many different methods to develop a successful counterinsurgency approach. As seen in the literature above, some focused on enemy-centric operations and others population-centric. Common to both approaches is the balancing of the counterinsurgent effort between the insurgent forces and the population. Additionally, most COIN approaches contain more than one method of implementation. One author, John Nagl focused on military organizations as “learning institutions.” In his analysis, he identified the ability of the British Army to adapt its COIN approach as a key to success in Malaya. This monograph seeks to further investigate the adaptive approach to COIN. While Nagl analyzed one successful and one unsuccessful COIN campaign to articulate the benefit of “learning institutions,” this study will analyze two successful COIN campaigns—one British and one American—to test the validity of adaptive approaches comprised of mixed-methods. To ensure a higher probability of accuracy in analysis this study selected two counterinsurgencies that contained similarities in terms of context and time.⁴⁸ The British campaign is the Second Boer War from 1899-1902, and the American campaign is the Philippine War from 1899-1902. With a familiar understanding of some of the varying COIN approaches, the next section of this monograph will clarify the methodology used to analyze both cases studies.

⁴⁷Nagl, 11.

⁴⁸“Context” here refers to the imperial nature of both counterinsurgencies. Furthermore, both campaigns occurred during the same period, 1899-1902.

METHODOLOGY

This section will review the methods of research collection and analysis of the two cases in this study. The study uses a framework similar to the RAND monograph series *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* to analyze two cases. The methodology comprises three parts to address the hypothesis and research question. The first part of the methodology is the phased narrative.⁴⁹ The second part is the analysis of each phase in the case according to the 20 COIN methods identified in the RAND monograph, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*.⁵⁰ The third part will compare all phases in both case studies, according to John Stuart Mill's "method of agreement," to identify which methods are present in both cases.⁵¹

Part 1: The Phased Narrative

Using a framework similar to *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, this study divided both cases into different phases of the campaign based on the author's interpretation of a major change in the counterinsurgent approach, insurgent approach, or other significant conditions in the case.⁵² The case study format comprises four parts. The first part is an anatomy of the case that provides a general overview of each phase in the campaign. The second part is the road to war detailing the circumstances that led to the conflict. The third part contains a summary narrative of each phase

⁴⁹This monograph uses the term "phase" to denote a change in the campaign, either through a change in the insurgent approach or COIN force approach. This is not to be confused with commonly accepted phases of a Maoist insurgency or the operational phases used by the U.S. military.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, xiii.

⁵¹Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 57.

⁵²Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 3.

of the case highlighting the various COIN methods used by the COIN force. The fourth part is an analysis of all phases and COIN methods used.

Part 2: Analysis of Individual Cases

Using the following table, this study coded each phase for the evidence of COIN methods that met the minimum criteria explained in chapter three of *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*. The main limitation to this method is the unrealized bias of the author to interpret the coding criteria. Because only the author coded the phases, there is room for inaccuracy in the data and analysis. Use of multiple people to code each phase would have been better; however, this was not possible given the time constraint on this research.

Table 1. Sample Case Study Method Coding

Method	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Development			
Pacification			
Legitimacy			
Democracy			
Resettlement			
Cost-Benefit			
Border Control			
“Crush Them”			
Amnesty/Rewards			
Strategic Communication			
COIN FM			
“Beat Cop”			
“Boots on the Ground”			
“Put a Local Face on It”			
Cultural Awareness			
Tangible Support Reduction			
Criticality of Intelligence			
Flexibility and Adaptability			
Insurgent Support Strategies			
Continuation and Contestation			

Source: Created by author.

Part 3: Comparison of Case Studies

The third part of the methodology used Mill’s method of agreement to determine what approaches were present in both case studies to identify the particular methods common to each successful COIN operation. In a similar fashion to the individual case study analysis, this study compared both cases based on the following table. The results of the comparison for the two case studies will address the hypothesis and research question.

Table 2. Sample Case Study Method Coding Comparison

Method	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3	
	Case Study 1	Case Study 2	Case Study 1	Case Study 2	Case Study 1	Case Study 2
Development						
Pacification						
Legitimacy						
Democracy						
Resettlement						
Cost-Benefit						
Border Control						
“Crush Them”						
Amnesty/Rewards						
Strategic Communication						
COIN FM						
“Beat Cop”						
“Boots on the Ground”						
“Put a Local Face on It”						
Cultural Awareness						
Tangible Support Reduction						
Criticality of Intelligence						
Flexibility and Adaptability						
Insurgent Support Strategies						
Continuation and Contestation						
Total Number of Methods						

Source: Created by author.

CASE STUDIES

Case Study #1: The Second Boer War, 1899-1902

Anatomy of the Case

This case study contains four parts: The Road to War, a narrative of the three phases, a summary of the campaign, and the analysis of the case. The Second Boer War occurred from 1899 to 1902 and was fought between two Boer Republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State), and the British Empire. For the purpose of this research, this study divided the campaign into three phases. Each phase marks a significant change in the approach by either the Boer or the

British forces. The first phase contains the initial Boer offensive into the two British colonies, Natal and Cape Colony. It begins on 12 October 1899 and continues through the last conventional battle of the war, fought from August to September 1900. The second phase begins with the end of the conventional war and a major shift by the Boer forces to a guerrilla campaign throughout the four South African colonies. The second phase ends with the failed peace agreement in March 1901. The third phase begins with the initiation of a more forceful British approach against the Boers. It contains the most aggressive period, ending with a majority vote from the Boer representatives agreeing to terms at the Peace of Vereeniging in May 1902. The final part of this case study is the summary and analysis of the COIN methods used during each phase of the war.

Road to War

Beginning in 1814 with Cape Colony, the British Empire established a foothold in South Africa. Throughout the middle of the nineteenth century British control continued to expand in South Africa and in 1880 came to a flashpoint during the first Boer War after the British Empire annexed the Transvaal. The Transvaal gained independence with the defeat of the British in 1881, however, British expansion on the continent continued through the end of the century. First, with the annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885, next the settling of Rhodesia from 1890 to 1895, and then the acquisition of Zululand by the Natal in 1897, the British Empire's colonial gains successfully surrounded the two Boer Republics adding to the animosity between the British and the Boer leadership.⁵³

Additionally, in 1897 Sir Alfred Milner became the High Commissioner in South Africa and began to lobby for equal rights of the Uitlanders—citizens of the British Empire living as laborers in South African colonies. In May 1899, after failed negotiations with Transvaal President Paul Kruger in Bloemfontein, Milner refused to continue attempts to resolve the

⁵³Eversley Belfield, *The Boer War* (London, UK: Leo Cooper, Ltd, 1975), 151-152.

Uitlander issue. In preparation for a potential conflict, Britain began reinforcing its South African colonies, which at the time contained approximately 10,000 troops. In response to this reinforcement, President Kruger of Transvaal and President Steyn of Orange Free State demanded withdrawal of all reinforcements from the borders within 48 hours.⁵⁴ This ultimatum expired on 11 October 1899 when the British refused to accommodate the Boer demands and on 12 October 1899, Boer forces invaded the Natal as the first act of war.⁵⁵

While this war began with Boer attacks into colonies of the British Empire, some scholars believe the British wanted this war and made every effort to provoke a Boer attack in order to maintain the political high ground in the international community:

[T]he British government was more concerned in 1899 with strengthening Britain's hold over the Transvaal and British supremacy in South Africa than with the rights of Uitlanders. But Uitlander rights and an Uitlander franchise offered a means to a larger end which gradually won the support of public opinion and became central to the *casus belli*.⁵⁶

British reinforcement of Cape Colony and the Natal provoked Boer leadership in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, who feared a loss of independence and sovereignty. With the victory over the British in 1881 fresh in their minds, the Boers declared war to preempt further encroachment of British control before the empire brought to bear its full weight on the limited Boer forces.

Phase One: "Conventional Fight" (October 1899 to September 1900)

Key Factors: British heavily relied on conventional tactics initially to defeat the Boer conventional forces. However, some key COIN methods helped develop the shape of the rest of

⁵⁴Dennis Judd and Keith Surridge, *The Boer War* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 50.

⁵⁵Belfield, 5-13. See also Judd and Surridge, 303-304.

⁵⁶Ian R. Smith, *The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902* (New York, NY: Longman Group Limited, 1996), 421. See also Judd and Surridge, 50.

the war. First, the British government used its influence on the international stage to successfully isolate the Boer forces from any substantial relief by foreign powers.⁵⁷ British Commanding Officer, Field Marshall Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts offered amnesty to those Boer elements willing to turn on their own forces. He authorized the formation of concentration camps with a two-fold purpose: first to separate turncoat Boers, known as “hensoppers,” from the remaining defiant Boers, known as “bitterenders,” and second, to separate the bitterenders from their base of supply.⁵⁸ Lord Roberts also instituted the policy of “scorched earth”—the burning of farms to punish those who adopted guerrilla tactics or aided guerrilla forces.⁵⁹

Although the British began to build forces in both Cape Colony and Natal prior to the Boer invasion, the Boers outnumbered the British approximately 4 to 1 at the start of the war.⁶⁰ The initial Boer strategy relied on the assumption that penetrations into the Natal and Cape Colony followed by decisive battles with the limited British forces would incite a rebellion. The Boer leadership believed a rebellion inside the British colonies would force the British

⁵⁷Belfield observes, “[w]orld opinion was almost universally favourable (*sic*) to the Boers, and the Dutch and French governments would have liked to make some practical gestures of support. But the British, with their formidable navy, were too powerful to be worth antagonizing over a region of Africa where these countries had no ready means of intervention;” Belfield, 103.

⁵⁸Judd and Surridge, 194.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 191.

⁶⁰The exact calculation of Boer forces is difficult to determine, however, understanding the unconventional division of the initial Boer formations and how they formed gives perspective to the actual size of the force. “In wartime, the major formation was the Commando which was based on the number of burghers in the electoral districts (22 in Transvaal and 18 in Orange Free State), they were sub-divided into wards, two for the smallest and five for the largest district. The size of the Commando varied from about 300 to 3,000 men. Even in the largest, like Pretoria, the military chief or Commandant was elected, which was symbolic of the democratic, pioneer spirit still prevailing;” Belfield, 9. Additional perspective of the British forces gives context between to the initial Boer success based on the disproportioned forces. “[W]hen war broke out, the British could only muster 27,000 troops, of whom 8,500 were local volunteers, such as the 1,000-strong Cape Mounted Police and the elite Uitlander Imperial Light Horse with 500 men;” Belfield, 11.

government to negotiate a peace, similar to the first Boer War in 1881.⁶¹ After initial success in conventional battles against the limited British forces, Boer forces besieged the towns of Kimberely, Ladysmith, and Mafeking. However, the Boer offensive failed to instigate a rebellion within the British Colonies, thus enabling reinforced British troops the ability to conduct a counteroffensive.

After the multitude of initial losses, British forces changed command from General Sir Redvers Buller to Lord Roberts. Roberts successfully regrouped British forces, starting in Cape Colony, while Buller remained in command of his own forces in Natal.⁶² Roberts conducted his counteroffensive on the besieged city of Kimberely, relieving it on 15 February 1900. While Buller continued his battle to relieve Ladysmith in the west, Roberts gained the first decisive British victory of the war on 27 February 1900 at Paardeberg.⁶³ The following day Buller relieved Ladysmith. As Roberts continued to win conventional battles, he simultaneously administered policies to set the conditions for a counterinsurgent strategy:

... between March and June 1900, General Roberts issued proclamations assuring those burghers who were prepared to take an oath of neutrality and abstain from further participations in the war, that they would be allowed to return to their farms and their property would be respected.⁶⁴

On 13 March 1900, when Roberts successfully captured Bloemfontein, the perception was that the war would be over with a final drive on Pretoria. As an act of good faith and confidence in his eventual victory, Roberts released most of the Boer prisoners.⁶⁵

⁶¹Smith, 1-2. See also Judd and Surridge, 93 and 106.

⁶²Belfield, 68.

⁶³Ibid., 88.

⁶⁴Smith, 7.

⁶⁵Belfield, 95.

Roberts continued his drive through the South African colonies as he defeated Boer forces on his way to the heart of the Boer Republics. However, in late March 1900 after the establishment of isolated British garrisons in the Orange Free State, Boer forces regrouped and began to employ guerrilla tactics. Led by Christiaan de Wet and President Marthinus Theunis Steyn, Boer forces ambushed isolated garrisons and destroyed public works, like the Bloemfontein waterworks, in a new part of their campaign against occupying British forces.⁶⁶ Roberts relieved the last besieged town of Mafeking on 17 May 1900 and Britain annexed the Orange Free State shortly thereafter.

While British forces continued to drive deeper into the Boer Republics, guerrilla tactics gained success against the British lines of communication.⁶⁷ As part of his enemy-centric strategy, “Roberts made his first priority the destruction of the Orange Free State forces that were such a menace to the Central Railway.”⁶⁸ Roberts assigned Kitchener to capture Christiaan de Wet, a leader key to the control and morale of the Orange Free State forces. During this first “de Wet hunt” it became evident that key elements of a COIN approach were lacking. A centralized command maintained too tight of a control over subordinate elements and limited information flow, which delayed reactions in time, and often provided faulty information because of a lack of cohesive information gathering.⁶⁹ Additionally, in August 1900, the British adopted a policy of burning farms of those Boers who re-entered the fight. The immediate cause turned “moderates into hard-core fighters.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶Belfield, 96.

⁶⁷Judd and Surridge, 183-184.

⁶⁸Belfield, 105.

⁶⁹Belfield, 108.

⁷⁰Ibid., 103; and Judd and Surridge, 191.

The transition from conventional warfare to irregular warfare occurred over the course of a few months. While the majority of Boer forces continued to fight the British through conventional means, some Boer forces switched back and forth between conventional and guerrilla tactics. Even Christiaan De Wet, one of the biggest proponents of guerrilla tactics, reverted to conventional tactics to unite with other Boer leaders like General Koos de la Rey and Louis Botha, during the last months of the initial phase of the war.⁷¹ However, the Boer leadership realized it faced inevitable defeat in a conventional war against superior British forces. In order to obtain a peace agreement suitable to Boer interests, they needed a change in strategy. The Boer leadership identified the British military's vulnerability to guerrilla tactics, specifically against isolated outposts and supply lines. The identification of a British weakness combined with the exuberance of the younger battle-hardened Boer leadership of Kritzinger, Christian de Wet, and Hertzog in the Orange Free State, and Botha, Koos de la Rey and Viljoen in Transvaal resulted in the complete change of strategy and the adoption of guerrilla warfare.

Phase Two: "Outbreak of an Insurgency"
(October 1900 to March 1901)

Key Factors: The change in British and Boer leadership further developed the irregular nature of the war. The initial change of leadership occurred on the side of the Boers as President Kruger abandoned the cause in September 1900. A reinvigorated Boer force, both Transvaal and Orange Free State, wholly adopted guerrilla warfare from October 1900 forward. After Roberts annexed the Transvaal, and before returning to England in December 1900, he appointed his chief-of-staff, Field Marshall Horatio Herbert Lord Kitchener as his successor. Kitchener maintained the established practices of concentration camps, and farm destruction characterizing the enemy-focused strategy to combat the fully emerged insurgency. In addition to the refinement

⁷¹Belfield, 98.

of methods employed by Roberts, Kitchener tightened control on information management, both within the military and the press.⁷² Kitchener solved the emerging problem of force reduction from soldier contract expiration with the augmentation of auxiliary forces. He stunted an emerging resistance within British controlled territory through instituting Martial Law to expand his control over the populace.⁷³ Finally, Kitchener increased the use of a scorched earth policy, and instituted large drives to clear inside areas secured through the growing system of blockhouses.

After the defeat of conventional Boer forces in September 1900, President Steyn of the Orange Free State and President Kruger of Transvaal formed different opinions of the Boer situation. The final hope for the existing Boer leadership to regain power was a change in British public opinion and support for the war if the Liberals could secure a victory in the September British parliamentary election:

Boer leaders pinned great hopes on British public opinion. They reasoned that combination of war-weariness and expense would make this conflict increasingly unpopular, that the Conservatives would be overthrown and the Liberals returned to power on the pledge of ending the war.⁷⁴

After the re-election of a conservative British government, this hope was lost causing the final divide between the two prominent Boer leaders. President Kruger prepared to flee the continent for asylum in Holland, while President Steyn continued to press the new leadership of the Boer resistance to remain defiant and protract the war. After all, the British government and, for the most part, popular opinion anticipated a quick defeat of the native forces prior to the beginning of

⁷²Judd and Surridge, 254.

⁷³Ibid., 229.

⁷⁴Belfield, 104.

the war.⁷⁵ By September 1900, Roberts declared the Transvaal a British Colony and ordered Buller to break up the Natal Army before he returned to England in early October.⁷⁶

In December 1900, Roberts returned to England leaving Kitchener as his successor. Faced with a maturing insurgency, Kitchener reformed his COIN approach that resulted in an almost immediate impact to the fledgling insurgency. In January 1901, Kitchener enacted Martial Law in the colonies allowing for “far greater scope to deal harshly and summarily with captured Boers and rebels than under an ordinary civil jurisdiction.”⁷⁷ Soldier contracts also provided Kitchener with a problem. As the contracts expired, Kitchener needed to replace the departing soldiers in order to maintain protection of his lines of communication, as well as a viable mounted element to pursue the guerrilla forces. To mitigate this shortfall, Kitchener started recruiting within the colonies and further developed a plan to secure the railway. Additionally, he relied on the expertise of the colonial troops from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa to provide skilled horsemen.⁷⁸

To cover the expanded territory of the four colonies, Kitchener decentralized his command and delegated more authority to his subordinate commanders, thereby increasing their autonomy on large offensive drives across the countryside. Additionally, he adopted new intelligence gathering tactics like those employed by one of his subordinate commanders Colonel Benson, whom “exploited his extensive knowledge of eastern Transvaal by recruiting and

⁷⁵Initially, public and political opinion in Britain expected a quick war to suppress the colonial uprising similar to those recently in Sudan and previous rebellions on the continent. “Without any allies to be considered, the nation was bursting with enthusiasm and self-confidence, many people thinking that it would be ended by Christmas,” Belfield, 13.

⁷⁶Ibid., 112.

⁷⁷Ibid., 137.

⁷⁸Belfield, 115-117.

training there a small body of native scouts who specialized in gaining, from local natives, up-to-date information on the movements of guerrilla bands.”⁷⁹

Another change to the COIN approach that reflected the immediate impact of the British change of leadership was Kitchener’s ability to control the media:

When Kitchener took over, press censorship became more stringent, particularly as he knew that the Boers could get a hold of British newspapers and he did not want them to read anything that might encourage them and so prolong the war . . . he utilised (sic) the services of H.A. Gwynne of Reuters news agency, who defended the conduct of the war in return for regular briefings.⁸⁰

He also focused the British efforts away from the Orange Free State forces towards the Transvaal and the pursuit of General Louis Botha, Commandant of the Transvaalers. British forces pursued Botha through large systematic drives across the grand expanses of the eastern Transvaal.

Kitchener’s plan, carried out by Lieutenant General French, consisted of driving forces in several columns to systematically encircle and clear the area. Kitchener’s first drive was tactically unsuccessful, ending with just over 1,000 prisoners and failure to capture General Botha.

However, it forced the Boers to cancel their planned invasion of the Natal and initiate peace discussions by Botha at Middelburg in March 1901.⁸¹ Unfortunately, they sent the drafted agreement to “both Milner and the home government, which modified most of the terms adversely for the Boers, refused to grant an amnesty to the 300 or so leading rebels, rendering them liable to be court-martialled (sic) and shot.”⁸² The sides could not come to agreeable terms; thus Kitchener continued his struggle with Milner to find an acceptable end.⁸³

⁷⁹Belfield, 137.

⁸⁰Judd and Surridge, 254.

⁸¹Belfield, 125-127.

⁸²Ibid., 127.

⁸³Bill Nasson, *The South African War 1899-1902*, (London, UK: Arnold Publishing, 1999), 203.

Phase Three: “Protracted War Favors the COIN Force”
(March 1901 to May 1902)

Key Factors: After a failed peace settlement between Kitchener and Botha, fighting resumed and the British continued to exact a harsh toll on the Boer insurgents. The British tested the resolve of the Boer insurgents through a policy consisting of scorched-earth, concentration of Boer civilians—separating the insurgent force from its base of supply—relentless raids and large scale drives. Additionally, Kitchener decentralized his command authority to his brigade level commanders with specific areas of responsibility. These areas contained a gridded blockhouse system that decreased the Boer freedom of movement and allowed British forces to increase the intensity of their offensive drives.

Although Kitchener failed to secure a peace treaty at Middleburg, the effects of negotiations stalled Boer plans for invasions of Cape Colony and Natal. Additionally, it created a fissure among the Boer leadership between those unwilling to negotiate and those seeking peaceable terms. Kitchener continued to expand the system of blockhouses—originally constructed for railway protection—to the main roads and other lateral lines of communication. The blockhouses spanned from one end of the colonies to the other and were linked together like a web constricting the Boer’s freedom of movement.⁸⁴ Additionally, the expanse of concentration camps grew to an extraordinary size and “[b]y May, 1901, 36 camps housed nearly 100,000 refugees, about half of whom were children”⁸⁵ The conditions of the concentration camps caused outside inquiries into their real purpose. Opponents of the British war like Emily Hobhouse “visited some camps and her lurid revelations led some foreign papers to allege that the British were trying to exterminate the Boer women and children.”⁸⁶ In response to the inquiries, the

⁸⁴Belfield, 132-133.

⁸⁵Ibid., 142. See also Judd and Surridge, 194.

⁸⁶Belfield, 142. See also Nasson, 203.

British government launched an inspection of these camps and made improvements to increase the living conditions to a more acceptable standard. “Although this scandal did lasting damage to the British cause, it must be stressed that, in principle, the Boers welcomed these camps.”⁸⁷ By taking control of Boer women and children, the men gained freedom of movement because they no longer worried about leaving their families alone and defenseless in a time of war. Additionally, the camps became a dual-purpose point of leverage for the British as “Kitchener recognized the military value to the Boers of these camps and banned further intakes” in December of 1901.⁸⁸

Other attempts to maintain pressure on the dwindling Boer forces were the 7 August proclamation of banishment issued by Kitchener and backed by Milner. Given a window of just over a month to surrender, Boers now faced banishment if captured.⁸⁹ Additionally, part of the solution to resource shortfall from increased British operations included recruiting among the captured Boer population whereby “[f]rom October 1901 the British began to raise men from inside the concentration camps.”⁹⁰ Kitchener continued to refine the counterinsurgency approach to shape the environment favorably on the continent and within the international community. By November 1901, the civilian administration gained control of concentration camps, the gold mining industry began to improve and “civil life was being restored.”⁹¹

⁸⁷Belfield, 142.

⁸⁸Ibid. See also Judd and Surridge, 215; and Nasson, 203.

⁸⁹Judd and Surridge, 210.

⁹⁰Judd and Surridge, 95. Not all Boers fought the British, and even some captured turned to the British side, to include Piet de Wet, brother of Christiaan de Wet. “A substantial number of Boers, however, would join the British in varying capacities. Initially, armed units were formed to guard towns and farms from marauding commandoes and to help establish the rudiments of civil government,” Judd and Surridge, 95.

⁹¹Ibid., 213.

Although Kitchener refined the COIN approach, large drives of British forces, supported by the web of blockhouses, continued to corral and defeat smaller insurgent groups, capturing key Boer leaders like Ben Viljoen in January 1902. Moreover, the drives continued to pressure others like Louis Botha to seek refuge in other regions.⁹²

[t]he night raids and several large drives were organized, without achieving significant result. But, together with systematic farm burning, these measures helped to produce a mounting sense of war-weariness among commandos in a region where the natives were hostile.⁹³

By the start of 1902 both British and Boer leadership began to feel the onset of the end of the war.⁹⁴ Kitchener once again reached out to the Boer leadership to re-open peace talks. The final peace negotiations began on 12 April 1902. “The combination of blockhouses, barbed wire, scorched earth and great offensive sweeps and drives had paid off. By May 1902, the Boers were exhausted and at the end of their tether.”⁹⁵ As part of the Peace of Vereeniging, commandos chose 30 delegates from each republic to vote on the peace treaty and on 31 May 1902, by a vote of 54 to 6, the terms were accepted amicably “including a guarantee that no rebels would be executed, and a British gift of 3 million [pounds] to help restore the economy.”⁹⁶

Summary

The Second Boer War began as a conventional conflict initiated by the isolated Boer Republics. Subsequently, the British conducted a counteroffensive to relieve the besieged cities within its two colonies and defeat the conventional Boer force. Annexing the two Boer Republics

⁹²Belfield, 153. See also Judd and Surridge, 215.

⁹³Ibid., 138.

⁹⁴Nasson, 203.

⁹⁵Judd and Surridge, 217. See also Nasson, 222.

⁹⁶Belfield, 148.

forced the Boers to initiate a protracted guerrilla war and the British were forced into an unwanted counterinsurgency. The implementation of tactics perceived today as harsh and illegal—like scorched earth, summary execution under Martial Law, and concentration camps—were the result of a COIN force adapting to a new paradigm in warfare. The former expeditionary colonial police force faced the largest deployment of the century consisting of over 500,000 soldiers over the course of the three-year war.

The British successfully isolated the Boers from outside reinforcement, destroyed their internal supply base, relentlessly pursued the resisting forces, and ultimately coerced them into peaceable terms. The British transition throughout the war steadily adapted their formations and approach to the enemy and environment. In the first phase of the war, the British lacked adequate forces to defend conventionally. After a series of reinforcements and their largest mobilization of the century, they successfully built enough combat power to conduct a counteroffensive to regain their colonial base and ultimately all four colonies in South Africa.

In the subsequent phases of the war, the transition from conventional to counterinsurgent strategy was a function of the change in leadership. While Roberts implemented moderately harsh policies of scorched earth and subsequent concentration camps, setting the stage for engaging in a counterinsurgent war, the refinement of strategy by Kitchener changed the face of the war. Kitchener expanded the use of concentration camps to control the populace and remove the base of support from the Boer forces. He instituted the construction of blockhouses and massive drives of flying columns to clear across the countryside. He also implemented diplomatic and political policies to seek an agreeable peace with the Boer leadership.

The Second Boer War is an example of the implementation of an adaptive counterinsurgency approach comprised of mixed-methods. In all three phases, the British adjusted their approach to maintain a position of relative advantage over the Boers. The COIN approach relied on an enormous system of blockhouses to strangle the South African countryside,

isolating the Boer insurgents from the elements that supported them. The British coerced the Boer leadership into a negotiated peace ending in the acknowledgement of the British crown as the sovereign in exchange for assistance in reconstruction, a position of power over the South African population, and relative independence under British rule.

Analysis

After coding the case study, five bundles of methods became evident. Bundle one consists of the methods not used in any phase. Bundle two represents the methods used in all phases. Bundle three consists of one method used during phase one, but not phases two and three. Bundle four consists of methods not present in phases one, adopted in phase two, and evident through phase three. Finally, bundle five consists of the one method added during phase three, but not present in phases one or two. Further grouping of the bundles shows the core British approach to counterinsurgency, consisting of bundles one and two, and the adaptations to the British approach, represented by bundles three, four, and five.⁹⁷ An explanation of the individual bundles will help clarify the analysis of the coded data.

⁹⁷By “core approach” this study refers to the methods employed through all stages of the campaign.

Table 3. Case Study #1 Method Coding

Method	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Development (Classic “Hearts and Minds”)		X	X
Pacification	X	X	X
Legitimacy			
Democracy	X		
Resettlement	X	X	X
Cost-Benefit	X	X	X
Border Control	X	X	X
“Crush Them”	X	X	X
Amnesty/Rewards	X	X	X
Strategic Communication			X
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency		X	X
“Beat Cop”	X	X	X
“Boots on the Ground”	X	X	X
“Put a Local Face on It”		X	X
Cultural Awareness			
Tangible Support Reduction	X	X	X
Criticality of Intelligence	X	X	X
Flexibility and Adaptability	X	X	X
Insurgent Support Strategies			
Continuation and Contestation			

Source: Created by author.

As depicted in table 4, bundle one consists of the four methods that were not present in any of the phases of the war. The four methods consisted of legitimacy, cultural awareness, insurgent support strategies, and continuation and contestation. As explained in the methodology, to code a method as present, it must meet the minimum criteria as prescribed in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*. In some cases, factors representative of those individual methods existed, however not enough to meet the minimum criteria. Bundle two consisted of the following 11 methods: flexibility and adaptability, criticality of intelligence, tangible support reduction, “boots on the ground,” “beat cop,” amnesty/rewards, “crush them,” border control, cost-benefit, resettlement, and pacification. Evidence of at least 12 out of 20 different methods in all phases reveals the mixed approach with which the British conducted their COIN operation. Together,

bundles one and two encompass the core British approach to counterinsurgency because it represents those methods used in all phases and those methods avoided in all phases.

Bundle three consists of a single method, Democracy. Based on the threshold for one of the four factors to be present, this was evident only in the first phase.⁹⁸ Since an appointed High Commissioner, who later gained responsibility for governing the two Boer Republics, governed the two British colonies, the study did not find evidence of the first three factors in any of the phases of the war. This study did find evidence of the fourth factor in the first phase, respect for human rights and allowance for freedom of the press. However, after the change in command and the beginning of phase two, Kitchener curbed freedom of the press through instituting a policy to control the media.⁹⁹ Additionally, Kitchener bolstered the policy of scorched earth that dramatically increased the number of civilians concentrated into camps, creating conditions that led to thousands of non-combatant casualties. This disregard for the human rights of Boer civilians justified the removal of the “democracy” method during phases two and three.

Bundle four consists of three methods—development, FM 3-24, and “put a local face on it”—which did not meet the criteria for phase one, but did in phases two and three. Development, or “hearts and minds,” consists of two factors, both of which need to be present for evidence in a phase.¹⁰⁰ Although this study assessed the second factor to be present in all three phases, the British did not make improvements to infrastructure or other forms of development until phase

⁹⁸The four factors for consideration of the “democracy” approach are “the government is a functional democracy,” “the government is a partial or transitional democracy,” “free and fair elections were held,” and “the government respects human rights and allows a free press;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 44.

⁹⁹Judd and Surridge, 254.

¹⁰⁰The first factor is “[s]hort-term investments, improvements in infrastructure or development, or property reform occurred in the area of conflict that was controlled or claimed by the COIN force,” and the second factor is “[i]n the area of conflict, the COIN force was not perceived as worse than the insurgents;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 37.

two, which they carried into phase three. “Put a local face on it,” consists of four factors with no set criteria to account for evidence. The four factors were not present in the first phase; however, two of the factors were present in phases two and three. The British used auxiliary forces in the second phase of the war to augment the loss of troops to reenlistment. Similarly, in phase three, the British continued to recruit from local Boers within the concentration camps to augment their forces.¹⁰¹ FM 3-24 consists of nine factors, three of which must be present for consideration in a phase. However, during the first phase only two factors showed evidence: “the COIN force sought to engage and establish positive relations with the population in the area of conflict,” and “the COIN force provided or ensured the provision of basic services in areas that it controlled or claimed to control.”¹⁰²

¹⁰¹The four factors applicable to “put a local face on it” are: “the COIN force employed local militias or irregular forces or engaged in or enabled community policing in areas that it controlled or claimed to control,” “the COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations,” “Indigenous forces conducted the majority of COIN operations,” and “Militias did not work at cross-purposes with COIN or government forces;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 67.

¹⁰²The nine factors applicable to the FM 3-24 method are: “a perception of security was created or maintained among populations in areas that the COIN force claimed to control,” “government corruption was reduced or good governance increased since the onset of the conflict,” “insurgent-claimed grievances were substantially addressed since the onset of the conflict,” “the COIN force sought to engage and establish positive relations with the population in the area of conflict,” “the COIN force provided or ensured the provision of basic services in areas that it controlled or claimed to control,” “there were short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure or development, or property reform in the area controlled or claimed by the COIN force,” “COIN forces received substantial intelligence from a population in the area of conflict,” “the majority of the population in the area of conflict supported or favored the COIN force,” and “the COIN force avoided culturally offensive behaviors and messages;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 59-60.

Bundle five consists of one approach, strategic communication, characterized by seven factors, of which two or more need to be evident to include this method as present.¹⁰³ In phases one and two, the only factor present was maintaining the unity of command. However, in phase three the factor of themes and messages matching the overall COIN strategy became apparent as Kitchener sought political and military solutions to end the conflict. Analysis of the changing approach is evidence of the flexibility of the British Army during the Second Boer War. In addition, the variety of methods used shows that there was not one method to end the insurgency. The British approach began as a comprehensive approach consisting of 12 methods and continued to adapt throughout the campaign. The approach dropped one method after phase one and incorporated four additional methods during phases two and three.

Table 4. Case Study #1 Bundles

Bundle	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
One	0	0	0
Two	X	X	X
Three	X	0	0
Four	0	X	X
Five	0	0	X

Source: Created by author.

¹⁰³The following seven factors comprise the “strategic communication” approach: “COIN force and government actions were consistent with messages (delivering on promises),” “[t]he COIN force maintained credibility with populations in the area of conflict (includes expectation management),” “messages or themes cohered with the overall COIN approach,” “COIN forces avoided creating unattainable expectations,” “themes and messages were coordinated across all involved government agencies,” “there was an earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort,” and “unity of effort or unity of command was maintained;” Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 56-57.

Case Study #2: The Philippine War, 1899-1902

Anatomy of the Case

This case study contains four parts: The Road to War, a narrative of the three phases, a campaign summary, and the analysis of the case. The Philippine War occurred from 1899 to 1902, fought between the U.S. and varying elements of conventional and irregular Filipino forces. For the purpose of this research, this study divided the war into three phases. Each phase marks a significant change in the war by either the American or the Filipino forces. The first phase contains the initial U.S. breakout from Manila and subsequent conventional battles on the Island of Luzon, in conjunction with initial efforts to expand onto the surrounding islands. It begins on 4 February 1899 and continues through to the defeat of the Army of Liberation and change in insurgent strategy to a protracted guerrilla war. The second phase begins in December of 1899, with the end of the conventional war and a shift to pacification of occupied territory, as well as the expansion of U.S. forces throughout the remaining territories of the Archipelago. The second phase ends with the failed proclamation of amnesty and the change in campaign strategy toward more aggressive methods. The third phase begins with the institution of G.O. 100 and continues through to President Roosevelt's declaration of the end of the insurrection on 4 July 1902. Phase three contains the most severe pacification policies during the campaign, ending in capitulation by the major leaders of the insurgent forces and an end to the effective resistance of American occupation. The final part of the study is the summary and analysis of the COIN practices used during each phase of the war.

Road to War

On 1 May 1898, Commodore Dewey located and destroyed the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay. Seeking to gain a position of advantage and force the Spanish to capitulate in Cuba, President McKinley decided to occupy the colonial capital in the Philippines. To accomplish this, President McKinley sent Major General Wesley Merritt to command the expeditionary ground

forces of the newly formed VIII Corps, and to seize the capital of Manila. In conjunction with the local Filipino “insurgents,” Merritt’s men occupied a siege line around Manila in August 1898. Realizing the imminent defeat, the Spanish commander negotiated for a token response to an American assault. In return, the Americans were to keep the Filipinos from entering the city.¹⁰⁴

On 13 August 1898, the First Battle of Manila ended with the occupation of Manila by Major General Merritt’s forces. In response to this, Emilio Aguinaldo, Commander of the Army of Liberation and leader of the Filipino resistance, again besieged the city. By the end of August, the positions remained unchanged and the U.S. continued to compel Spain for capitulation. Also at the end of August, Major General Elwell S. Otis replaced Major General Merritt as Commander of Eighth Corps. The tension-rich relationship between U.S. forces inside Manila and Aguinaldo’s forces on the outskirts continued with minor conflict between the opposing sides.

During this stalemate, small skirmishes and posturing of forces occurred between both sides; however, Aguinaldo and Otis were quick to diffuse the situations when they arose. Aguinaldo wanted to maintain his position outside of Manila and continue to spread his influence throughout the rest of the provinces. Otis’s focused on professionalizing his predominantly volunteer force, increasing the standard of living inside Manila—to include reestablishing the local police force, cleaning the streets, reopening markets, rebuilding roads and other key

¹⁰⁴Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 6. Also evident when Linn stated “Faced with starvation and a bloodbath if the revolutionaries broke into the city, the Spanish commander resolved this impasse by agreeing to surrender after token resistance if the American would keep the Filipinos out;” Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 8.

infrastructure—and rehabilitating the education system.¹⁰⁵ These initiatives were a hallmark of the conciliatory part of the Army’s pacification plan.

On 10 December 1898, Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, ceding the Philippines to the U.S. As a result, on 21 December 1898 President McKinley conveyed his intentions for Philippines to Major General Otis stating it was the responsible obligation of the U.S. to occupy and govern all of the islands.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, McKinley wanted the Army “to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines,” stating “that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and the right for arbitrary rule.”¹⁰⁷ While minor skirmishes and confrontations occurred, both sides continued to live alongside each other and attempted to avoid war. However, on 4 February 1899, after the controversial exchange of fire between an American sentry and Filipino patrol, the Philippine-American War began.¹⁰⁸

Phase One: “A Conventional War?”
(4 February 1899 to November 1899)

Key Factors: The U.S. strategy called for use of conventional tactics alongside some COIN methods - auxiliary forces, amnesty offers, and public works as part of the overall “benevolent assimilation.” After the “breakout” from Manila in February 1899, Otis expanded his

¹⁰⁵Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000). 31.

¹⁰⁶United States, Adjutant-General’s Office, *Correspondence relating to the war with Spain: including the insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1993.), 858-859.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*; and Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 9.

¹⁰⁸Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 12. See also David J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2007), 64.

forces throughout Luzon and then to surrounding islands. With the cooperation of U.S. Navy gunboats, he employed a multipurpose blockade to isolate the islands. Otis relentlessly pursued the leadership and Army of the Liberation, and then turned his focus to stabilizing the newly occupied territories. Additionally, Aguinaldo initially decided to fight a conventional war, with little success. However, the terrain and weather proved to be an advantage for the retreating Philippine forces. This brief respite gave the Army of Liberation time to regroup and prolonged their inevitable adoption of guerrilla war.

On 4 February 1899, hostilities erupted to start the Philippine War in the initial battle known as the Second Battle of Manila. Following the defeat of Filipino forces and the subsequent U.S. counteroffensive against the Army of Liberation's siege line, Major General Otis proceeded on two lines of operation. The main line of operation began on the Island of Luzon with the breakout of Manila and pursuit of the Army of Liberation on the northern half of the island. The second line of operation consisted of the decentralized efforts to occupy the smaller islands of the Archipelago. The Navy was instrument in holding together these two lines of operation and integral to the success of the war. The naval blockade maintained friendly lines of communication and denied the Filipino forces the ability to resupply and coordinate efforts between islands:

Perhaps the most important task the navy undertook during the summer and fall of 1899 was a general blockade of the Philippines . . . it made it enormously difficult for the insurgent forces to get supplies, either from other areas of the Philippines or from outside countries. And finally, it gave the Americans a lever to use against the wealthy Filipinos, whose riches were, in many cases, created by or founded on trade. The blockade could thus be both a carrot or a stick, punishing those who resisted and rewarding those who did not.¹⁰⁹

On Luzon, Otis focused on two main tasks from February 1899 to June 1899—pursuit of the Army of Liberation, and establishing civil order in the newly acquired territory. First, Otis successfully divided the elements of the Army of Liberation in the north from the Army of

¹⁰⁹Silbey, 115-116.

Liberation elements in the south with a limited campaign led by Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton in March. Next, Otis reconsolidated his forces to pursue Aguinaldo and the northern element of the Army of Liberation in his campaign toward the Philippine Republic's capital of Malolos.¹¹⁰ Then, in late March 1899, the civilian commission led by Jacob G. Schurman, President of Cornell University, arrived to assist with implementing President McKinley's policy of pacification.¹¹¹

In areas outside of the island of Luzon, Otis planned a series of economy of force missions to establish footholds at key ports on smaller islands. Starting in mid-February and facing minor resistance, Brigadier General Marcus P. Miller occupied the port city of Iloilo on the island of Panay. However, his small force limited his ability to pursue the insurgents further inland. As a result, Brigadier General Miller began to rebuild the city's public services and establish the American foothold, balancing his limited military operations with the policy of benevolent assimilation.¹¹² An additional contingent led by Colonel James Smith occupied the island of Negros after the island leadership appealed to Major General Otis for protection in exchange for the acceptance of U.S. rule.¹¹³

The early months of the war looked different for U.S. forces based on the region of their occupation. The majority of U.S. forces continued to improve the positions in Manila through March when Otis began his attack north in an attempt to trap the Army of Liberation. The attack successfully seized the Philippine Republic's capital, but failed to capture Aguinaldo or his Army of Liberation. Following the end of the campaign north in May 1899, the summer months brought

¹¹⁰Linn, *The Philippine War*, 88.

¹¹¹John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973), 80.

¹¹²Linn, *The Philippine War*, 69-70.

¹¹³Gates, 79.

monsoon and forced Otis to stall his offensive until the weather improved and reinforcements arrived.

Otis conducted few military operations throughout the summer because of the weather, terrain, and a decreasing force due to disease, battle casualties, and enlistment terminations. He focused efforts on the improvement within his expanded perimeter around Manila, the lines of communication running from Manila—garrisoned by smaller isolated company sized elements—and addressing aspects of political and social reform. “By the summer of 1899, Otis was becoming increasingly concerned with how to administer the conquered areas. The challenges were no longer simply military. Instead, they were military, political, and social.”¹¹⁴ As part of his solution, Otis authorized the creation of local police forces, an auxiliary force—the Macabebes—to augment his low troop numbers, and issued G.O. 43, which established the framework for civil government.¹¹⁵ Additionally, the insurgent forces on the outlying islands began to feel the effects of the navy’s blockade. The naval blockade served a multitude of purposes. It kept Aguinaldo’s forces separated logistically— isolated from external support and finance through trade— and it reduced the effectiveness of his ability to command and control a unified effort against the American forces.¹¹⁶ In the southern islands of the archipelago, American control extend when “the sultan of Sulu signed the Bates Agreement with the United States on August 20, 1899, in which he submitted to U.S. control, in return for his continued status as local ruler and the allowance of slavery within Sulu.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Silbey, 112.

¹¹⁵Linn, *The Philippine War*, 128-130.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, 130-131.

¹¹⁷Silbey, 113.

In the September 1899, Otis received reinforcements and began preparations for his fall offensive on the island of Luzon. He aimed to finally destroy the Army of Liberation and capture Aguinaldo. Otis's strategy consisted of a three-prong attack with MacArthur attacking from the south through central Luzon, Lawton to his east along the Rio Grande River, and Wheaton conducting an amphibious assault to Lingayen Bay to seal off the Army of Liberation's escape.¹¹⁸ At the beginning of November, Otis's force attacked north capturing key supply depots and scattering Aguinaldo's forces into small retreating elements. After continued defeats and realizing he was fighting a losing battle, Aguinaldo decided to dissolve the Army of Liberation and adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare. Otis's force continued their offensive, pursuing the fleeing forces deeper into the island eventually halting. Seeing that the Filipinos no longer fielded a force large enough to resist his Army, Otis declared the collapse of the Philippine Republic and began to transition his forces to occupation duties.

During the conventional battles on Luzon, Otis's smaller expeditionary elements applied different methods to implement the policy of benevolent assimilation. The efforts on the outer island included negotiation and pacification—through starvation with the help of the naval blockade—as well as peaceful assimilation—through implementation of public works, local elections, and security operations to safeguard the cooperative population from the violent resistance on the island. The naval blockade was integral to the success of the smaller efforts because it kept issues localized. In addition, it segmented and separated the larger Filipino resistance effort from internal support and unity of efforts.

¹¹⁸Linn, *The Philippine War*, 139-140.

Phase Two: “Benevolent Assimilation”
(November 1899 to December 1900)

Key Factors: Otis’s failure to recognize the threat of the insurgency allowed the decentralized Filipino elements to strengthen and prolong the pacification process. MacArthur recognized the potential problems with Otis’s public works focus and his lack of aggressive military operations to quell resistance. However, MacArthur’s ability to effectively implement changes to the operational approach were limited by the monsoon season degrading troop capability and the potential for a negative impact on President McKinley during the November 1900 presidential election. As a result, MacArthur maintained Otis’s policies with minor changes in response to the Agunialdo’s fall offensive aimed at influencing the presidential election. The stagnation in COIN approach at the theater level did not stall the adaptation of the regional, district, and local COIN approaches, which drew heavily from the guidance of General Order 100. However, MacArthur waited until after the election results were final before officially adopting provisions of General Order 100 in December 1900.

From the beginning of December 1899 through February 1900, Otis’s army expanded throughout the archipelago to include the outer islands and the Bicol Peninsula of Luzon. This expansion solidified the U.S. control over the Philippines, allowing Otis the ability to focus on establishing a governmental structure and continued pacification through benevolent assimilation.¹¹⁹ At the same time, the insurgents reorganized for guerilla warfare, separating their forces into regulars and militia. The regulars fought as guerillas from isolated locations in the jungle and mountains, while the militia remained in the towns garrisoned by American forces, collecting intelligence and acting as a base of supplies for the guerilla forces.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹Silbey, 133-134; and Gates, 128-129.

¹²⁰Linn, *The Philippine War*, 187.

In the beginning of 1900, both American and insurgent forces ran parallel programs to establish governance throughout the archipelago. In March 1900, Otis issued G.O. 40— a follow-up to G.O. 43 published in August 1899—that outlined a structure for the Filipino government.¹²¹ Additionally, Otis created the Military Division of the Philippines—comprised of four departments, further divided into districts—with himself as the dual-hatted general of the military division and military governor of the Philippines. At the same time, Aguinaldo’s decentralized insurgency attempted to tax the population and enforce authority with their own elected officials in a “shadow government.”¹²²

While the COIN approach remained heavily focused on the civic works and enacting President McKinley’s policy of benevolent assimilation at the theater level, pacification at the regional level varied greatly. In northern Luzon, from January 1900 through April 1900, insurgents operated a shadow government and maintained support of the local populace.¹²³ The insurgent activity consisted of ambushing logistical patrols and sniping at smaller garrisons. In southern Luzon, American forces remained enemy focused with only minor insurgent activity. The pacification program in southern Luzon was a secondary effort as the populace initially fled the towns in early 1900, and when they returned did not cooperate with public works and governmental reforms.¹²⁴ In areas outside of the island of Luzon, each island brought its own challenges spanning the spectrum from active resistance with minor insurgent activity to cooperation and embrace of American pacification.¹²⁵ Without major resistance to U.S.

¹²¹Silbey, 116 and 136-137; and Linn, *The Philippine War*, 200-201.

¹²²Linn, *The Philippine War*, 191.

¹²³Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace*, 47-49.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 80-84.

¹²⁵Linn, *The Philippine War*, 170, 179, and 246.

pacification and the implementation of the way ahead for reconstruction, Major General Otis turned over command to Major General Arthur MacArthur in May 1900.¹²⁶

After he assumed command, MacArthur instituted a series of decrees supporting Otis's initial pacification plan. However he restrained from drastically altering the approach because of the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November 1900. Beginning in May 1900, MacArthur issued G.O. 87, directing the arming of local police, and creation of "constabulary bodies."¹²⁷ The following month MacArthur initiated a 90-day period of amnesty for insurgents.¹²⁸ At the same time of MacArthur's new appointment, the second Philippine Commission, led by William H. Taft, arrived in Manila "to establish municipal and provincial governments and to oversee the transfer of power from the military governor to colonial rule."¹²⁹

In response to growing Filipino support for Americans, insurgents waged campaigns of terror to deter cooperation with American forces.¹³⁰ During the summer of 1900, insurgents increased attacks on American forces to display the strength of the resistance, intending to influence both Filipino and American citizens, and potentially alter the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.¹³¹ While both sides vied for support of the population, American forces responded to the increased insurgent activity with adaptations to the policy of benevolent pacification. Through adopting instructions outlined in G.O. 100, commanders gained the ability

¹²⁶Linn, *The Philippine War*, 206.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 204.

¹²⁸Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace*, 50.

¹²⁹Linn, *The Philippine War*, 216.

¹³⁰Gates, 164-168.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, 162; and Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 138; and Linn, *The Philippine War*, 272.

to implement harsh punishments against both civilians and insurgents.¹³² Even though the local commanders adapted their individual tactics—including burning civilian homes and limited “reconcentration” of populations—to deal with the insurgency in their immediate areas, the resistance successfully continued throughout the fall of 1900.¹³³ Awaiting the end of the November 1900 presidential election, MacArthur remained wedded to a less aggressive approach allowing the resurgence of an insurgent offensive to continue.

Phase Three: “G.O 100 and the Benefits of Coercion”
(December 1900 to July 1902)

Key Factors: MacArthur’s implementation of G.O. 100 enabled subordinate commanders to employ more coercive methods sanctioned by the military governorship. Additionally, the shift from military to civilian governorship and incorporation of the Filipino Federal Party facilitated a political solution.

In December 1900, MacArthur instituted a comprehensive pacification policy to account for the American shortfalls of the previous strategy of benevolent assimilation. The policy consisted of numerous reforms with the ultimate aim of separating the insurgent resistance from the civilian population. The policy maintained the beneficial programs of benevolent assimilation; however, it emphasized a more military solution to pacification.

On 20 December, MacArthur issued his proclamation to inform the Filipino population of the new reforms and their implications. Based on the provisions in G.O. 100, the new policy allowed harsh punishment, to include execution if found guilty, for those who supported the insurgents, either actively or passively. This policy forced civilians to realize the consequences of not actively supporting the American pacification. Additionally, new policy reforms organized a

¹³²Linn, *The Philippine War*, 212 and 293.

¹³³*Ibid.*, 302-303.

Division of Military Information to serve as a hub to collect and disseminate intelligence throughout the Philippines.¹³⁴ MacArthur increased the authorization for the number of auxiliary and native police forces.¹³⁵ He authorized the establishment of more garrisons across the archipelago and ordered subordinate commanders to increase the number of patrols to further restrict movement of insurgent forces. Where commanders were unable to extend security to the area through increased patrols and garrisons, the units concentrated the population to the few places they could garrison. This facilitated the protection of the local populace and prevented support of the insurgents.¹³⁶

In conjunction with the second Philippine commission, MacArthur instituted extensive road and bridge construction with the purpose of expediting friendly force movement and logistical support, as well as improving infrastructure to benefit the local populace after pacification.¹³⁷ Another effort in conjunction with Taft's commission was the transitioning of military to civilian authority for provinces designated as pacified. This policy started in 1900, but increased rapidly during 1901 as MacArthur's new approach gained increased success. In addition to allowing the military to focus its efforts on pacification, it continued to convey the benevolent nature of the American mission in the Philippines.

Throughout the beginning months of 1901, the effects of MacArthur's new policies were evident in the number of insurgents who voluntarily surrendered, as well as the number of relinquished weapons. Supporting the constant patrols, extensive garrison developments, and strict justice for those who did not conform to U.S. pacification, were amnesty policies put in

¹³⁴Gates, 206.

¹³⁵Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 110.

¹³⁶Gates, 218-219.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, 211.

place in March 1901. MacArthur emphasized favorable concessions allowing immediate release for those insurgents who voluntarily surrendered and swore oaths of allegiance, as well as a policy of prisoner exchange for relinquished weapons.¹³⁸ Additionally, the newly formed Federal Party assisted in encouraging civilian support for the American pacification policy and convincing insurgents to surrender.¹³⁹

In northern Luzon, the successful implementation of the new approach brought the insurgency to a halt with successive captures of key insurgent leaders like Alipio Tecson in January 1901, and Emilio Aguinaldo in April 1901, and the surrender of Urbano Lacuna in May 1901.¹⁴⁰ The command over southern Luzon experienced similar results with the surrender of Aguinaldo's southern commander Mariano Trias in March 1901, and Juan Cailles in June 1901.¹⁴¹ However, continued resistance from Miguel Malvar and his remaining forces in Batangas prevented the immediate pacification of southern Luzon. Because of the great success of the new policy, by the summer of 1901, the insurgency seemed to be nearing an end.¹⁴²

With the insurgency near defeat, Secretary of War Elihu Root, took the opportunity to remove MacArthur from his governorship and replace him with civilian commissioner William H. Taft. This change of leadership relinquished military control of the Philippines to civilian authority. Major General Adna R. Chaffee replaced MacArthur as the senior military authority in the Philippines, whose "primary task was to divorce the army from its civil functions so as to

¹³⁸Gates, 217-218. See also, Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace*, 62.

¹³⁹Sibley, 165; Linn, *The Philippine War*, 265.

¹⁴⁰Linn, *The Philippine War*, 274.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, 295-197.

¹⁴²United States, Adjutant-General's Office, 1273.

restore the Philippine army to military efficiency.”¹⁴³ In line with this directive, Chaffee redesignated the former military departments and districts as the Department of the Northern Philippines, comprised of Luzon, and the Department of Southern Philippines, which included the rest of the archipelago.¹⁴⁴

During the summer months of 1901 the insurgency continued to shatter in all but two regions, the Batangas and the island of Samar. On the island of Samar, in an isolated incident known as the “Balangina Massacre,” the insurgency showed signs of life.¹⁴⁵ The brutal attack coordinated by a local insurgent leader, Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio Daza, killed 48 out of a 74-man garrison causing an outcry for vengeance.¹⁴⁶ In response, Chaffee sent the controversial Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith to pacify the island. The overzealous Smith conducted a campaign of exacting punishment on the inhabitants of Samar, both civilian and insurgent. Through the extensive use of gunboat patrols to locally constrict the island supplies, burning crops, homes, and executions, Smith turned Samar into a “howling wilderness,” between October and January 1901.¹⁴⁷ After Smith’s tactics spilled over to the neighboring island of Leyte, Taft pressured Chaffee to curtail the indiscriminately violent commander. Smith reformed his controversial methods in January and February of 1902, and in conjunction with the capture of long time insurgent leader Vicente Lukban, the resistance began to crumble again.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³Linn, *The Philippine War*, 218.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁴⁵Stuart Creighton Miller, “*Benevolent Assimilation:*” *The American conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982), 202-205.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 310-312.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 316-319.

¹⁴⁸Gates, 253-256.

At the same time, Miguel Malvar commanded the insurgency in Batangas. In November 1901, Chaffee appointed Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell as commander in Batangas and tasked him with pacifying the province. Bell instituted a harsh policy aimed at separating the insurgents from their supporting base. These included concentrating the population into safe zones and destroying food, buildings, and supplies outside of the zones. However, he made the clear distinction to his subordinate commanders to make all efforts to protect the Filipinos requesting escape from the insurgents' terror. In addition, his commanders would severely punish those who defied the American pacification effort and aided the insurgent resistance. Together with vigorous patrols, Bell's pacification efforts successfully strangled the insurgency, and in April 1902 Malvar surrendered bringing the campaign in Luzon to an end.¹⁴⁹ With the majority of the Philippines successfully pacified by May 1902, President Roosevelt, who succeeded President McKinley after his assassination, issued a proclamation on 4 July 1902, stating his appreciation for the armed forces that "have put down and ended the great insurgency which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States."¹⁵⁰

Summary

U.S. national strategy in the Philippines consisted of benevolent assimilation through pacification. The counterinsurgency approach followed the general principle of coercion balanced with conciliation to win the population away from the Filipino resistance in favor of autonomy under U.S. colonial rule. From the outset of the war, the U.S. military maintained a parallel civilian counterpart to achieve the best result possible in the shortest amount of time. Major General Otis initially focused on the destruction of the Army of the Liberation, followed by the

¹⁴⁹Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 59.

¹⁵⁰United States, Adjutant-General's Office, 1352.

establishment of public works projects. However, he failed to implement a complete operational approach to solve the increasing insurgent problem.

Initially hampered by the potential of negative effects on the U.S. presidential election, Major General MacArthur instituted a theater policy based on G.O. 100 to address the shortfalls of Major General Otis's conciliatory focused policy. The institution of more coercive methods provided the American forces the advantage needed to separate the population from the insurgent effort. Even after the short resurgence of resistance in Batangas and Samar, the punitive methods mixed with increased control by Taft's civilian commission successfully managed the remaining resistance and solidified the pacification, as declared by President Roosevelt on 4 July 1902.¹⁵¹

Analysis

After coding the phases in this cases study, four bundles became evident.¹⁵² Bundle one consists of those approaches not used in any phase. Bundle two consists of the approaches present in all three phases. Bundle three consists of the approaches present in only the phases two and three, but not present in phase one. Finally, bundle four consists of the approach present only in phase three, but not in phases one or two. Further grouping of the bundles shows the core American approach to counterinsurgency, consisting of bundles one and two, and the adaptations to the American approach, represented by bundles three and four.

¹⁵¹One important note on the completion of pacification even though President Roosevelt declared a successful end to the Philippine war in July 1902, the resistance continued in pockets throughout the archipelago well into the early 20th Century. Although declared a success by President Roosevelt, the real success came about through defeat of the mass resistance and the institution of a self-sustaining government capable of defeating resistance and insurgent activity as it sprang forth.

¹⁵²See table 6.

Table 5. Case Study #2 Method Coding

Method	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Development (Classic “Hearts and Minds”)	X	X	X
Pacification	X	X	X
Legitimacy		X	X
Democracy		X	X
Resettlement			X
Cost-Benefit	X	X	X
Border control	X	X	X
“Crush Them”		X	X
Amnesty/Rewards		X	X
Strategic Communication	X	X	X
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency	X	X	X
“Beat Cop”	X	X	X
“Boots on the Ground”	X	X	X
“Put a Local Face on It”	X	X	X
Cultural Awareness			
Tangible Support Reduction	X	X	X
Criticality of Intelligence	X	X	X
Flexibility and Adaptability	X	X	X
Insurgent Support Strategies			
Continuation and Contestation			

Source: Created by author.

Depicted in table 6, bundle one consists of three methods, that were not present in any of the phases of the case study. The three methods consisted of cultural awareness, insurgent support strategies, and continuation and cessation. Similar to the previous case study, all methods showed some factors in each phase however, none of the methods met the minimum criteria for inclusion. Bundle two consists of 14 methods: development, pacification, cost-benefit, border control, strategic communication, FM 3-24, “beat cop,” “boots on ground,” “put a local face on it,” tangible support reduction, criticality of intelligence, and flexibility and adaptability. Evidence of 14 methods out of 20 in all phases is evidence of an adaptive COIN approach comprised of mixed-methods.

Bundle three consists of four methods: “crush them,” legitimacy, democracy, and amnesty and rewards. Each of these approaches failed to meet the minimum criteria until phase two, and continued as part of the overall COIN strategy through phase three. The incorporation of these four methods is evidence of the ability of the American force to adjust to the changes from a hybrid war—conventional on Luzon, but irregular on the outer islands—to a complete COIN strategy. It is also evident of the carryover of approaches used in one form of conflict to the next.

Bundle four consists of one approach, resettlement. This approach is characterized by one factor, “[t]he COIN force resettled or removed civilian populations for population control.”¹⁵³ Although there were instances of concentration during phases one and two, the majority of the COIN force did not implement this approach. During phase one, on the island of Panay in the summer of 1899, the population was lured into controlled zones with increased food rations to separate insurgents from civilians.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, in phase two, other officers used this technique to control small villages by moving the population into a garrisoned area, or garrisoning a village to control and protect it; however this did not meet the subjective coding criteria of this research study.¹⁵⁵ It was only during phase three that this became a defining method in both southern Luzon under Brigadier General Bell and the island of Samar under Brigadier General Smith.

Analysis of the changing approach shows the flexible nature of the American military during the Philippine war. Although the war started with a hybrid of conventional and irregular approaches used to defeat the insurrection, the COIN force further adapted to incorporate additional approaches to meet the change in insurgent strategy.

¹⁵³Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 47.

¹⁵⁴Linn, *The Philippine War*, 170.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 293.

Table 6. Case Study #2 Bundles

Bundle	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
One	0	0	0
Two	X	X	X
Three	0	X	X
Four	0	0	X

Source: Created by author.

Case Study Comparison and Analysis

The following section draws analysis from tables 7 and 8. After comparing both coded cases, the analysis identified six bundles and five findings.¹⁵⁶ The first bundle consists of the three methods not implemented by either British or American COIN forces. The second bundle consists of the eight methods employed by both COIN forces in all three phases. The third bundle consists of five methods implemented by one COIN force in all three phases and by the other in only the second and third phase. The fourth bundle consists of the methods used by one COIN force in all three phases and by the other in only the last phase. The fifth bundle consists of one method used only by the American COIN force in phases two and three. The sixth bundle consists of one method, used only by the British in phase one, but then only by the Americans in phases two and three. The first three findings relate directly to the bundling of methods by phase. The fourth finding consists of the start, adaptation, and end approach employed by each COIN force. The fifth findings relates to the convergence of both COIN forces towards a common set of methods used in each approach.

Finding One

Bundle one consists of the cultural awareness, insurgent support strategies, and continuation and contestation methods. The importance of the lack of evidence of these three

¹⁵⁶See table 8.

methods, points to one-half of the core approach implemented by each COIN force. The second bundle contains the eight methods common to both COIN forces throughout all three phases. The eight common methods are pacification, cost-benefit, border control, “beat cop,” “boots on the ground,” tangible reduction support, criticality of intelligence, and flexibility and adaptability. Together bundles one and two make up the common core approach for both COIN forces.

Finding Two

Bundle three highlights methods employed by only the British or the Americans in phase one, but incorporated by the other in second and third phases. During phase one, the British employed “crush them” and amnesty, whereas the American COIN force did not. This is ironic considering they are opposing methods, which when combined resemble the common characteristics of “carrot-and-stick.” However, it shows the diversity of the approach by addressing both enemy and the population instead of either one or the other. The American COIN force implemented the methods of development, COIN FM 3-24, and “put a local face on it.” These three methods are commonly associated with the population-centric approach. This suggests that the American COIN force initially focused on a population-centric COIN approach. However, only five out of the 20 COIN methods are oriented specifically towards an enemy-centric approach. The American approach in phase one contained four out of five methods which suggests the COIN approach was diverse.

Finding Three

As depicted in bundle four, both the British and American COIN forces maintained one distinct method throughout all three phases, but the other COIN force did not incorporate them into their approaches until their final phase of the campaign. The British employed the method of resettlement throughout all three phases, whereas the American COIN force only incorporated it in the last phase. Similarly, the Americans employed the method of strategic communication

throughout all three phases, but the British did not meet the criteria of evidence until phase three. This finding shows an initial divergence of methods in each approach with a convergence towards a common approach by the end of the campaign.

Finding Four

Both American and British COIN forces started their campaigns with evidence of 12 practices in their approaches. The British included two additional methods to their approach between first and second phase, and then one additional approach in the third phase. The American COIN force added four methods to their approach between the first and second phase, and then one additional method in the third phase. This illustrates a gradual change to the British approach, demonstrating minor adjustments to a sound approach that required very little adaptation. Whereas in the American approach, including four additional methods to the initial approach suggests the COIN force's base approach was inadequate. Additionally, this could indicate a lack of experience in COIN requiring a greater degree of adaptation before identifying the necessary methods for a successful approach.

Alternatively, this could demonstrate the American COIN force's willingness to adapt its approach to incorporate a greater diversity of methods, thus maintaining flexibility in the conduct of their counterinsurgency. Moreover, the British COIN force, while ultimately successful, remained more rigid in the approach and less open to adaptation. While either interpretation is possible, the importance for this study is the concept of adaptation of the original approach, not the degree of adaptation to the original approach.

Finding Five

The fifth finding is the commonality between British and American approaches. Both started with 12 methods and adapted their approach as the campaigns continued. Additionally, they implemented 14 common methods within their approaches by the end of both campaigns.

Not only does this suggest a lack of significant difference between the approaches used by both COIN forces, but also it is an indication of the necessity for an adaptive mixed-method approach.

Table 7. Case Study Method Coding Comparison

Method	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3	
	Case Study 1	Case Study 2	Case Study 1	Case Study 2	Case Study 1	Case Study 2
Development		X	X	X	X	X
Pacification	X	X	X	X	X	X
Legitimacy				X		X
Democracy	X			X		X
Resettlement	X		X		X	X
Cost-Benefit	X	X	X	X	X	X
Border Control	X	X	X	X	X	X
“Crush Them”	X		X	X	X	X
Amnesty/Rewards	X		X	X	X	X
Strategic Communication		X		X	X	X
COIN FM		X	X	X	X	X
“Beat Cop”	X	X	X	X	X	X
“Boots on the Ground”	X	X	X	X	X	X
“Put a Local Face on It”		X	X	X	X	X
Cultural Awareness						
Tangible Support Reduction	X	X	X	X	X	X
Criticality of Intelligence	X	X	X	X	X	X
Flexibility and Adaptability	X	X	X	X	X	X
Insurgent Support Strategies						
Continuation and Contestation						
Total Number of Methods	12	12	14	16	15	17

Source: Created by author.

Table 8. Case Study Comparison Bundles

Bundle	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3	
	British	American	British	American	British	American
One	0	0	0	0	0	0
Two	X	X	X	X	X	X
Three	0	0	X	X	X	X
Four	X	0	X	0	X	X
Five	X	0	0	X	0	X
Six	0	0	0	X	0	X

Source: Created by author.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study tested the hypothesis that a COIN force should use an adaptive approach comprised of mixed-methods to adjust to the environment as necessary. The evidence provided in this monograph validates this hypothesis. The primary research question is, in the future should COIN forces adopt an exclusively enemy-centric or population-centric approach to gain a comparative advantage and increase the potential for success? Based on the affirmation of the hypothesis, the answer to the primary research question is “no.” A COIN force should include both population-centric and enemy-centric methods. Both British and American COIN forces applied a mixed-method approach throughout each campaign. Both COIN forces adapted their approach based on the conditions of the environment. Additionally, with the exception of the British approach losing the method of “democracy” between the first and second phases, both COIN forces continued to expand their approaches through incorporation of additional methods, instead of adopting new methods and discarding others. This suggests the nature of adaptation in a COIN approach should be inclusive.

In addition to addressing the hypothesis and answering the primary research question, this study identified two recommendations. First, this study suggests consideration of the eight methods present in all phases by both COIN forces at the start of future counterinsurgency campaigns to increase the probability of success. This recommendation is based on the limited

data available in the two case studies analyzed in this monograph. However, further analysis of other counterinsurgencies showing similar results is needed as an additional indicator for the probability of success garnered from implementing the eight methods. As a caveat to this recommendation, this study is aware that all counterinsurgencies are unique and call for operational approaches based on each specific situation. Employing methods and approaches successful in previous counterinsurgencies does not guarantee success in future campaigns.

This recommendation reinforces the current British and American counterinsurgency doctrine in terms of the mixed-method adaptive approach. The British Army Field Manual 10, *Countering Insurgency*, Volume 1, Part 10, advocates population-centric focused counterinsurgency when it states, “efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support.”¹⁵⁷ To achieve this aim, the manual discussed the necessity for a comprehensive framework when it states, “[s]uccessful counterinsurgency requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the political, economic, social, cultural and security dimensions of the unrest.”¹⁵⁸ Similarly, American counterinsurgency doctrine states, “COIN is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success.”¹⁵⁹ Although the manual advocates a “general approach” to counterinsurgency, the clearly stated aim suggests a population-centric focus. Like the British doctrine, FM 3-24 suggests a whole-of-government approach. This is evident when it states that obtaining the aim of a counterinsurgency campaign “requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN [Host Nation] agencies in a comprehensive approach.”¹⁶⁰ Although this recommendation and the

¹⁵⁷Ministry of Defence. British Army Field Manual 10, *Countering Insurgency*, vol. 1 (Warminster, UK: Ministry of Defence, October 2009), i.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 1-6.

¹⁵⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-28.

monograph generally align with the concepts in both British and American doctrine, it does not advocate one exclusive focus over the other—population-centric or an enemy-centric.

The second recommendation is a suggestion for future study. The adaptive approach comprised of mixed-method proved effective in both counterinsurgencies. Although both COIN forces began their respective COIN effort with eight common methods, they each also employed four different methods during the initial stage of the war. Due to the limited data set based on time, this study was unable to address whether the starting approach is connected to the overall success of the COIN campaign. Both COIN forces employed a mixed-method approach that incorporated additional methods as it adapted. However, future study of counterinsurgencies may prove that a COIN approach can adapt from one approach—based on a certain group of methods— to another approach—consisting of different methods—and remain successful. Based on this assumption, a recommendation for future study is to identify if the starting COIN force approach is related to success in counterinsurgency, or if it is successful based on the ability to adjust the approach over time.

¹⁶⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1-28.

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